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I. INTRODUCTION 
For the past several decades, the United States has been faced 
with important questions concerning its immigration policies.1  
Although current discussion covers many areas of immigration, the 
deportation of criminal aliens is one of the most hotly debated.2  
Daniel Kanstroom notes that the U.S. is undergoing a “massive 
deportation experiment that is exceptionally sweeping and harsh by 
virtually any historical or comparative measure.”3  Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS) records reveal that there have been more 
than twenty-five million deportation events in the past twenty-five 
years.4  Further evidence of the explosive number of deportations is 
                                                          
1 See, e.g., Daniel Kanstroom, “Passed Beyond Our Aid:” U.S. Deportation, 
Integrity, and the Rule of Law, 35 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 95, 95 (2011).  
Kanstroom acknowledges the reality of “more than eleven million undocumented 
people living and working” within the United States.  Id. at 96–97.  He focuses on 
some of the questions that specifically have to do with the deportation of those who 
hold green cards, arguing that it is important to critically examine how the system 
is working.  Id. at 98.  Some of the questions he presents are: “What are the real 
policy goals of this form of deportation?  Should a long-term lawful permanent 
resident with substantial U.S. family ties be deported for petty crimes, such as the 
possession of a marijuana cigarette?  Is the system working in a fair and just way?”  
Id. at 99. 
2 See, e.g., Kanstroom, supra note 1; Nancy Morawetz, Understanding the 
Impact of the 1996 Deportation Laws and the Limited Scope of Proposed Reforms, 
113 HARV. L. REV. 1936 (2000). 
3 Kanstroom, supra note 1, at 97; Daniel Kanstroom, Immigration Law: 
Current Challenges and the Elusive Search for Legal Integrity, in IMMIGRATION 
PRACTICE MANUAL 0101, § 1.1 (2nd ed. 2012) [hereinafter Current Challenges].  
See also Peter L. Markowitz, Deportation is Different, 13 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1299 
(2011) (“By every objective measure, deportation has never before been such a 
pervasive feature of American society and never before been so connected to the 
criminal process.”).  
4 Kanstroom, supra note 1, at 97; Current Challenges, supra note 3, at § 1.1 
(citing Table 36 of DHS OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, 2009 YEARBOOK OF 
IMMIGRATION STATISTICS 95 (2010), available at 
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/yearbook/2009/ois_yb_2009.pdf; 
DHS OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS: 
2010 (2011), available at 
http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/immigration-
statistics/enforcement_ar_2011.pdf. 
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the estimated backlog of 300,000 deportation cases.5  The system 
struggles to accommodate the large number of pending cases, as 
there are only 272 immigration judges available to handle the cases.6   
Coupled with, and perhaps fueling, the influx in deportations is the 
U.S. public’s perception of immigrants.7  Americans generally view 
immigrants as criminals and lump undocumented (or “illegal”) 
immigrants in the same category as immigrants who were lawfully 
admitted to the country.8  Deportation campaigns initiated by the 
government refer to “criminal aliens” and place emphasis on 
targeting the “worst of the worst” aliens.9  The truth is that many of 
those who are deported are legal permanent resident aliens 
(permanent residents), also known as “green card” holders.10  They 
were lawfully admitted to the U.S., have grown up in the U.S., and 
have fully integrated with the culture and members of the 
population.11  For these individuals, deportation means that they will 
                                                          
5 See Adriane Meneses, The Deportation of Lawful Permanent Residents for 
Old and Minor Crimes: Restoring Judicial Review, Ending Retroactivity, and 
Recognizing Deportation as Punishment, 14 SCHOLAR 767, 772 (2012). 
6 Id.  
7 See Markowitz, supra note 3, at 1348–49.  Markowitz notes that: 
 
[P]ublic perception increasingly and unambiguously conflates 
deportable offenses and crimes.  This is true on both sides of the 
ideological spectrum—whether it is the liberal who is shocked to 
learn that detained immigrants do not receive appointed lawyers 
or the conservative talk show caller who declares all “illegal 
immigrants are criminals.”  Indeed, Americans increasingly view 
undocumented immigrants in particular, and immigrants in 
general, as criminals.  This is so even though deportation 
proceedings continue to enjoy the formal “civil label” and even 
though the great weight of empirical evidence demonstrates that 
immigrants are less prone to criminal activity than native-born 
populations.   
 
Id. 
8 See id. 
9 See, e.g., Associated Press, Record Number of Criminals Deported, Many 
Based on Traffic Violations, FOXNEWS.COM (July 22, 2011), 
http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2011/07/22/traffic-violations-make-up-bulk-
offense-among-deported-criminals/. 
10 See, e.g., Current Challenges, supra note 3, at § 1.1. 
11 Id.  
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be removed from the country and separated from all that they have 
ever known, including family, friends, and a familiar lifestyle.12  
They are taken to places outside of the U.S. where they do not know 
anyone, do not understand the culture and, perhaps, do not even 
know the local language.13  They are not permitted to re-enter the 
U.S., even for a short visit to see family members left behind.14  
Further, although many of the permanent residents who are deported 
have committed crimes, they can hardly be collectively described as 
the “worst of the worst” criminal offenders.15  Instead, statistics show 
that many permanent residents are deported for committing relatively 
minor offenses.16 
Permanent residents who commit deportable offenses often face 
more severe consequences than aliens who entered the country 
illegally.17  Further, permanent residents have been seriously 
impacted by reforms in immigration law.18  Particularly in the 1990s, 
acts of terrorism such as the bombing of the World Trade Center in 
1993 and the Oklahoma City Bombing in 1996 fueled the negative 
public perception of immigrants and encouraged U.S. policymakers 
                                                          
12 Id.  
13 Id.  A palpable example of a case where an alien is sent “back” to a country 
he has virtually no association with is drawn from the case of a boy named Joao 
Herbert.  See Meneses, supra note 5, at 774.  Herbert was an alien who was 
adopted from Brazil by two United States citizens.  Id.  He was never naturalized, 
but was raised by his adoptive parents in the U.S.  See id.  During high school, 
Herbert was arrested for selling marijuana.  Id.  He was then deported and sent to 
Brazil, where he was unable to adapt to the language and culture.  Id. at 774–75.  
Later, Herbert was shot and killed in the slums.  Meneses, supra note 5, at 775. 
14 Id.  David Sullivan writes that given the harsh consequences of deportation, 
it comes as no surprise that the Supreme Court has referred to deportation as “a 
‘drastic measure’ that is ‘the equivalent of banishment or exile.’”  Dennis M. 
Sullivan, Immigration: The Consequences of a Criminal Conviction, 63 WIS. LAW. 
16, 16 (1990) (citing Fong Haw Tan v. Phelan, 333 U.S. 6, 10 (1948)).  
15 See Meneses, supra note 5, at 774. 
16 Id. (“The crimes triggering deportation of lawful permanent residents are 
often minor offenses, but are lumped together with far more serious crimes by 
overly broad categories.”).  See also Current Challenges, supra note 3, at § 1.1 
(explaining that “the vast majority of criminal deportees stand accused of relatively 
minor offenses.”). 
17 Meneses, supra note 5, at 773. 
18 See Morawetz, supra note 2, at 1936. 
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to create legislation reflecting the concern for national security.19  
Two such pieces of legislation—the Antiterrorism and Effective 
Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) and the Illegal Immigration 
Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA)—
expanded the reach of removal laws and drew criticism from the 
policy, professional, and government sectors.20  The 1996 laws may 
actually make it more likely that a permanent resident convicted of a 
criminal offense will face deportation.21  
The effect of these laws, which will be discussed in more detail 
infra,22 is particularly important to the realm of administrative law, 
where administrative review is crucial to ensuring that decisions 
made on the administrative level will not have arbitrarily negative 
and irreversible effects upon deported aliens.  There is evidence that 
an increased number of immigration cases decided at the 
administrative level23 are being appealed to the courts of appeals.24  
                                                          
19 See Anthony Distinti, Gone but Not Forgotten: How Section 212(c) Relief 
Continues to Divide Courts Presiding over Indictments for Illegal Reentry, 74 
FORDHAM L. REV. 2809, 2821 (2006); Kanstroom, supra note 1, at 95. 
20 Kanstroom, supra note 1, at 95.  These laws  
 
dramatically (and retroactively) expanded many grounds for 
exclusion and deportation, creating mandatory detention for may 
classes of non-citizens; inventing new “fast-track” deportation 
systems; eliminating judicial review of certain types of 
deportation (removal) orders; discarding some and limiting other 
discretionary “waivers” of deportability; vastly increasing 
possible state and local law enforcement involvement in 
deportation; and even permitting the use of secret evidence for 
non-citizens accused of “terrorist”  activity.  As a direct result of 
these laws, hundreds of thousands of people have been excluded 
and deported from the United States who—under prior laws—
would have been allowed to become legal permanent residents 
and (probably) naturalized citizens. 
 
Id. at 95–96.   
21 Morawetz, supra note 2, at 1937.   
22 See infra notes 28–34, 58–62, 91–121 and accompanying text. 
23 It is important to understand the structure of the administrative system 
governing deportation cases.  In the 1920s, Congress created the Immigration 
Board of Review as a part of the Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization.  Rick 
Fang-Chi Yeh, Today’s Immigration Legal System: Flaw and Possible Reforms, 10 
RUTGERS RACE & L. REV. 441, 445 (2009).  In the 1940s, Congress replaced the 
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The courts of appeals often reverse and openly criticize immigration 
judges’ decisions.25  However, critics of the administrative review 
process have argued that, “administrative and judicial review of 
deportation cases has been severely limited for many years.”26  The 
lack of judicial review has resulted in mistakes that have not been 
noticed.27  On top of this, AEDPA and IIRIRA have arguably 
decreased aliens’ access to the judicial process by limiting the 
availability of hearings for aliens.28 
The enactment of AEDPA and IIRIRA has clearly expanded the 
potential for administrative error in at least one area: the application 
of what was formerly known as the section 212(c) waiver.29  Before 
AEDPA and IIRIRA were passed, section 212(c) of the Immigration 
and Nationality Act (INA) gave the Attorney General the discretion 
                                                          
Immigration Board of Review with the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) 
within the Department of Justice (DOJ).  Id.  In 1983, the BIA was combined with 
the Immigration Trial Court, a branch of the former Immigration and Naturalization 
Service (INS).  Id.  Together, these two bodies became the Executive Office for 
Immigration Review (EOIR), which currently stands as the agency that controls 
U.S. immigration adjudication.  Id. at 445–46.  The Director of the EOIR reports to 
the U.S. Attorney General.  Id. at 446.  The Attorney General appoints hundreds of 
immigration judges to sit as administrative judges in various immigration trial 
courts throughout the country.  Id. at 446–47.  Within the EOIR, the BIA remains 
the highest administrative appellate body for immigration cases.  Id. at 447–48.  It 
has appellate jurisdiction to hear all immigration appeals.  Id. at 448.  
24 Id. at 441–42 (“In recent years, the number of immigration cases petitioned 
from the immigration administrative agencies to the United States Court of Appeals 
. . . has increased sharply even though immigration cases filed at the administrative 
and appellate level increased at a normal pace.”) (parenthesis omitted).  
25 See id. at 442.  Fang-Chi Yeh attributes the high reversal rates to the DOJ’s 
immigration policy reforms, arguing that the reforms do not work because they fail 
to address the more structural deficiencies of the immigration adjudication.  Id. at 
442–43.  He states that “[t]he underlying flaw is the system’s foundation, which is 
not built to successfully handle the current number of immigration cases while 
ensuring fair and impartial trial outcomes.”  Id. at 443. 
26 Kanstroom, supra note 1, at 101. 
27 Id. 
28 See R. Andrew Chereck, The Deportation of Criminal Immigrants, 9 L. & 
BUS. REV. AM. 609, 611 (2003). 
29 See Distinti, supra note 19, at 2811 (stating that “AEDPA and IIRIRA 
created confusion in criminal reentry cases where the [BIA] or an [immigration 
judge] failed to consider a potentially eligible alien for section 21(c) relief during 
his deportation.”). 
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to waive the deportation of permanent residents who had committed 
crimes for which they could be deported.30  If the waiver was 
granted, the alien could retain permanent resident status and remain 
in the U.S.31  Section 248 of IIRIRA replaced section 212(c) with a 
new section called “cancellation of removal.”32  However, the 
Supreme Court has held that the section 212(c) waiver still applies to 
aliens who would have been eligible for the waiver at the time they 
pled guilty to the deportable offense.33  Where the Board of 
Immigration Appeals (BIA) or an immigration judge mistakenly fails 
to allow an alien discretionary relief under the waiver, issues of 
fairness in the administrative review process come into play.34 
Avoiding errors associated with section 212(c) is especially 
important because errors in deportation cases may prove to be 
irreversible.35  Even where the Supreme Court has reviewed removal 
                                                          
30 Id. at 2819.  
31 Id. at 2820. 
32 Chereck, supra note 28, at 611.  The Cancellation of Removal provision was 
codified under INA section 240(a).  Distinti, supra note 19, at 2822.  Another 
major change in brought about by the 1996 legislation was AEDPA’s amendment 
of section 212(c), which made it so that the waiver could not apply to aliens who 
were convicted of aggravated felonies.  See Fernandes Pereira v. Gonzales, 417 
F.3d 38, 40 (1st Cir. 2005). 
33 Distinti, supra note 19, at 2822–23 (citing Immigration & Naturalization 
Service v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 326 (2001)). 
34 See Distinti, supra note 19, at 2828–32.  Both the Ninth and Second Circuits 
have held that “failure to consider an alien for section 212(c) relief can constitute 
fundamental unfairness.”  Id. at 2832.  To prove unfairness, the alien has to show 
that the failure prejudiced him or her in some way.  Id. at 2838. 
35 See Kanstroom, supra note 1, at 101–02.  In the case Fernandes Pereira v. 
Gonzales, 417 F.3d 38 (1st Cir. 2005), the First Circuit held that “nunc pro tunc 
relief is unavailable to remedy an agency’s erroneous interpretation of the law.”  
Corey M. Dennis, Immigration Law—Nunc Pro Tunc Relief Unavailable Where 
Erroneous Legal Interpretation Rendered Alien Ineligible for Deportation 
Waiver—Pereira v. Gonzales, 417 F.3d 38 (1st Cir. 2005), 40 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 
1049, 1049 (2007).  See also Pereira, 417 F.3d at 47.  Nunc pro tunc is “an avenue 
of discretionary relief historically available to aliens who, but for a judicial error, 
would have been eligible for a deportation waiver.”  Dennis, supra note 14, at 
1051.  The respondent in Pereira had been convicted of an aggravated felony and 
sentenced to thirty years’ imprisonment.  Pereira, 417 F.3d at 40; Dennis, supra 
note 14, at 1051.  The court reasoned that this took him out of the running for relief 
under the waiver because “section 212(c)’s plain language indicates Congress’s 
intent to render discretionary relief unavailable to aliens incarcerated for at least 
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decisions and found errors in reasoning, a deported alien has virtually 
no remedy and the burden and consequences of the mistake fall 
solely on the alien.36  Arguably, the BIA and immigration judges may 
consider a removed alien’s motion to reopen or reconsider the case.37  
Such motions are discretionary tools that might be presumed to 
                                                          
five years on aggravated felony offenses.”  Dennis, supra note 14, at 1051; see also 
Pereira, 417 F.3d at 48.  Dennis argues that although the First Circuit came to the 
correct conclusion in Pereira, it did not give due deference to the fact that nunc pro 
tunc relief has been available to correct mistakes in immigration cases for a long 
time and that Congress has not prevented the BIA from awarding relief under 
section 212(c) for more than sixty years.  Dennis, supra note 14, at 1054.  Dennis 
also argues that “the court failed to recognize that [nunc pro tunc] relief is 
necessary to mitigate the harsh consequences of deportation laws.”  Id.  
36 Kanstroom, supra note 1, at 101–02.  Kanstroom argues that the uncaught 
mistakes should not be taken lightly.  Id. at 102.  
 
All of these facts add up to a powerful indictment of the 
accuracy, integrity, justice, and fairness of the deportation 
system.  It indicates that many thousands of deportees may 
reasonably claim that they should still be in the United States, 
living with their families.  The full scope of this problem can 
probably never be accurately measured.  But we can try.  
Consider the many millions of people who have been deported in 
the last fifteen years, and then imagine a miniscule—maybe one 
or two percent—error rate.  Even assuming such a small error 
rate, we are still talking about some 80,000 to 100,000 mistakes 
over the past several years alone, including refugees, asylum-
seekers, and many thousands of long-term legal residents. 
 
Id.  Some might be surprised that the mistakes do not only affect non-U.S. citizens.  
Mistakes made in deportation cases have also lead to the deportation of U.S. 
citizens.  Id. at 100 (referencing the case of Pedro Guzman, a cognitively disabled, 
U.S. citizen born in California who was arrested for trespassing and mistakenly 
deported to Mexico).  Kanstroom describes Guzman's case as follows: 
 
Mr. Guzman was transferred to ICE custody, which transported 
him by bus to the streets of Tijuana.  No attorney or family 
members were ever present during the removal process.  Mr. 
Guzman had virtually no money and could not contact his family.  
He wandered the streets for three months, eating out of garbage 
cans and bathing in the Tijuana River while his terrified family 
desperately searched for him. 
 
Id. at 100–01. 
37 See id. at 102. 
    
Spring 2013     Raising the Standard 269 
provide the safety net that removed aliens who think their case was 
decided erroneously may utilize to have their case re-heard.38  
However, this is not true in practice as the BIA has held that removed 
aliens have “passed beyond [its] aid,” a statement that carries the 
weight of defeat for many who could have benefitted from another 
shot at the system.39   
Where mistakes in legal theory and reasoning made in removal 
cases are not caught, the results can be devastating for the aliens such 
mistakes affect.40  The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Judulang 
v. Holder41 recognized this, and condemned any standard of review 
regarding the section 212(c) waiver that would facilitate error 
through arbitrary and capricious application.42  Judulang addresses 
the issues that are important in today’s immigration climate, 
answering some of the difficult questions that were raised concerning 
the administrative review of removal cases after the enactment of the 
AEDPA and IIRIRA.43  The case also clears up questions concerning 
how criminal aliens should be viewed within the current system and 
                                                          
38  See id. 
39 See id.  Kanstroom describes the BIA’s conclusion that removed aliens are 
beyond help: 
 
Deportation . . . is a “transformative event that fundamentally 
alters the alien’s posture under the law.”  Thus, the consequence 
of a deportee’s removal—even if it was done in error—is “not 
just physical absence from the country, but also a nullification of 
legal status, which leaves him in no better position after 
departure than any other alien who isoutside the territory of the 
United States.”  That is to say, in this legal limbo, the deportee 
fundamentally lacks rights.   
 
Id.  Kanstroom criticizes the BIA’s approach by asserting that, “[t]his rigid, 
formalist approach means that countless mistakes have likely gone undiscovered, 
let alone rectified.”  Id. 
40 See supra notes 12–14 and accompanying text.  See also Allen C. Ladd, 
Protecting Your Non-Citizen Client from Immigration Consequences of Criminal 
Activity, S.C. LAW., May 2004, at 38, 40 (stating that, “the consequences [of 
criminal convictions for non-citizens] are often severe: forcible removal from the 
United States . . . and a bar to lawful admission . . . in the future.”). 
41 132 S. Ct. 476 (2011). 
42 See discussion infra Part IV. 
43 See discussion infra Part IV. 
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narrows the margin of error in removal cases where section 212(c) 
may be applied.44  Although Judulang does not answer all of the 
questions currently facing the United States immigration system, it 
could potentially temper the number of mistakes made during the 
removal process by admonishing immigration courts and the BIA to 
utilize sound reasoning in deciding which aliens will ultimately be 
considered deportable.45  
This note examines Judulang and its impact on review standards 
for determining section 212(c) eligibility.  Part II of this note will 
focus on the impact that AEDPA and IIRIRA have had on the 
availability of relief for permanent residents who have been slated for 
removal and how the administrative review process has confronted 
these changes.46  Specifically, that part addresses the historical 
availability of the section 212(c) waiver and how the 1996 legislation 
affected permanent residents convicted of crimes prior to the 
enactment date of the new laws.47  It will address the struggle that 
courts engaging in the administrative review process have had in 
deciding cases involving the waiver and the various approaches the 
circuit courts have taken in an attempt to define the correct standard 
for deciding which classes of aliens the waiver may apply to.48   
Part III of the note summarizes Judulang’s factual and procedural 
background.49  Part IV engages in a step-by-step analysis of Justice 
Elena Kagan’s unanimous opinion and addresses the Court’s 
treatment of the arbitrary and capricious standards utilized by the 
BIA to make removal decisions.50  Part V of the note addresses the 
impact Judulang has had on immigration law, both generally and 
with respect to administrative law.51  The note concludes that even 
though Judulang fails to neatly answer every question that arises on 
this subject, it does take a step in the right direction.52  Judulang’s 
                                                          
44 See discussion infra Parts IV and V. 
45 See discussion infra Parts IV and V. 
46 See infra Part II. 
47 See infra Part II. 
48 See infra Part II. 
49 See infra Part III. 
50 See infra Part IV. 
51 See infra Part V. 
52 See infra Parts V and VI. 
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holding is particularly significant in an area of law where the 
standards used to decide immigration cases upon appeal have been 
varied and, at times, difficult to interpret.53  The holding also ensures 
a certain level of procedural due process for permanent residents who 
have committed minor offenses in the past and upon whom 
deportation would have a devastating effect.54 
 
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
Historically, the fact that an alien is eligible for deportation has 
not meant conclusively that the alien will be deported.55  Immigration 
                                                          
53 See infra Parts V and VI. 
54 See infra Parts V and VI.  The due process considerations related to 
deportation proceedings are complex.  Part of the issue is that because deportation 
proceedings are considered civil rather than criminal proceedings, they are not 
afford the same level of due process protections as criminal proceedings.  See 
Meneses, supra note 5, at 769–70.  Shaneela Khan describes the situation Legal 
Permanent Residents (LPR) face this way: 
 
Imagine coming to the United States as a legal resident, but 
only imagine that you have come right after kindergarten, when 
you barely understand the difference between being a citizen and 
being a legal resident.  From childhood to adulthood, you have 
known no other home than America, and consider yourself 
nothing else but an American.  So when you commit a crime, you 
expect to be convicted through due process, and then sentenced 
to jail, like any other American.  However, imagine instead that 
after you have committed a crime, your punishment may entail 
being kicked out of this country and having to return to the 
country you were born in, one that you barely remember and 
have had no connection to since you were a baby.  Further, 
imagine that before your removal hearing, you are imprisoned.  
As an American, you would have had the right to a hearing 
before being imprisoned, and perhaps have been able to post bail 
and get released.  However, since you are a legal permanent 
resident, you have no such rights and your freedom can be taken 
prior to a removal hearing, without judicial review. 
 
Shaneela Khan, Alienating Our Nation’s Legal Permanent Residents: An Analysis 
of Demore v. Kim and its Impact on America’s Immigration System, 24 J. NAT’L 
ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDGES 113, 113–14 (2004). 
55 See THOMAS ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF ET AL., IMMIGRATION AND 
CITIZENSHIP PROCESS AND POLICY 750 (7th ed. 2012). 
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law has provided several venues through which even aliens who have 
been convicted of deportable offenses can seek relief from removal.56  
The reasoning behind allowing a criminal alien to remain in the 
United States relates to the significant impact removal has on 
noncitizens and their families.57  The enactment of AEDPA and 
IIRIRA in 1996 changed the way in which at least some of these 
waivers work.58 
Understanding the impact that AEDPA and IIRIRA have had on a 
permanent resident’s eligibility for a waiver requires an overview of 
how the governing law has changed over the past several decades.59  
Historically, immigration has been governed by the Immigration and 
Nationality Act of 1952 (INA).60  Before the AEDPA and IIRIRA 
                                                          
56 Id. 
57 Id.  See also supra notes 13–14 and accompanying text.  Aleinikoff et al. 
write that  
 
[t]he longer a noncitizen has lived in the United States—legally 
or illegally—the  greater the ties she is likely to have established 
and the greater the hardship that removal will  entail.  The 
burdens do not fall solely on the noncitizen: family and friends 
may be deprived of significant personal relationships, employers 
may lose productive employees, and neighborhoods may lose 
valued residents.  Not surprisingly, then, a number of avenues of 
relief are available to noncitizens, especially those who have 
lived in the United States for a substantial period of time and 
have close relatives who are U.S. citizens or permanent residents. 
 
ALEINIKOFF ET AL., supra note 55, at 750. 
58 See id. at 754. 
59 See infra notes 60–135 and accompanying text. 
60 Chereck, supra note 28, at 609.  As described in Landon v. Plasencia, the 
Act allowed the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) to 
 
examine “all aliens” who [sought] “admission or readmission to” 
the United States and empower[ed] immigration officers to take 
evidence concerning the privilege of any persons suspected of 
being an alien “to enter, reenter, pass through, or reside” in the 
United States, and to detain for further inquiry “every alien” who 
[did] not appear “to be clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to” 
enter.  Under [section] 236(a), if an alien [was] so detained, the 
officer [was] directed to determine whether the alien “shall be 
allowed to enter or shall be excluded and deported.” 
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were added as amendments to the INA in 1996, there were separate 
procedural tracks for deportation and exclusion cases.61  One aspect 
that truly differentiated deportation proceedings from exclusion 
proceedings was that aliens slated for exclusion could apply to the 
Attorney General for discretionary relief under the INA’s section 
212(c), while aliens placed in deportation proceedings could not.62    
Relief under section 212(c) granted an excludable alien re-entry 
into the United States as long as two conditions were met.63  First, the 
alien must have resided lawfully in the United States for a minimum 
of seven years before temporarily leaving the country.64  Second, the 
alien could not be excludable on two specific grounds.65  The two 
non-applicable grounds included (1) aliens who threatened national 
security and (2) aliens guilty of the international abduction of 
children.66  In deciding whether an alien qualified for relief, the 
immigration judge balanced various factors such as the severity of 
the crime(s) and rehabilitation.67  The alien’s sentence could not 
exceed five years, and the alien had to show that his or her relatives 
would face “hardship” if he or she were deported.68 
Although section 212(c) did not originally apply to deportable 
aliens, this changed when the BIA was called on to decide the case, 
                                                          
459 U.S. 21, 21 (1982). 
61 See Judulang v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 476, 479 (2011).  Exclusion cases are 
cases in which an alien is seeking entry or re-entry to the United States, while 
deportation cases are cases in which an alien is already within United States 
borders.  See id. (citing Landon, 459 U.S. at 25).  For a detailed description of the 
statutory grounds for deporting or excluding an alien from the U.S., see infra note 
97 and accompanying text. 
62 Judulang, 132 S. Ct. at 479–80. 
63 Id. at 480. 
64 Id. 
65 Id.  
66 Id. at 480 n.1.  The provision preventing the Attorney General from waiving 
exclusion for aliens who were excludable on these two grounds was codified in 
INA section 1182(c), but has been repealed.  See id. at 479–80.  The two 
excludable grounds—aliens posing a threat to national security and aliens guilty of 
international child abduction—are found in INA section 1182(a)(3) and section 
1182(a)(9)(C), respectively.  Id. at 480 n.1. 
67 Chereck, supra note 28, at 610. 
68 Id. 
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Matter of L-----.69  In this case, the BIA conceded that the deportation 
sections of the Immigration Act of 1917 did not provide for relief, 
and that, historically, relief was only granted in exclusion cases.70  
The BIA struggled with the question of whether to extend the 
provision to deportation cases, noting that the case “involve[d] a 
question of difficulty.”71  Finally, the BIA referred the question to the 
Attorney General, who reasoned that Congress did not intend for the 
immigration laws to operate in such a way as to preclude deportation 
cases from the reach of the statute.72  Therefore, the Attorney General 
                                                          
69 Judulang, 132 S. Ct. at 480.  See Matter of L-----, 1 I. & N. Dec. 1, 7 (BIA 
1940).  The case Matter of L----- marked the first time an immigration court 
applied section 212(c) to a deportation case.  Judulang, 132 S. Ct. at 480.  In that 
case, the respondent was a Yugoslavian national who came to the United States in 
1909.  Matter of L-----, 1 I. & N. Dec. at 1.  In 1924, he was convicted of larceny 
and received a one-year probation.  Id.  The respondent left the United States in 
1939 for a short two-month visit to Yugoslavia, and thereafter was re-admitted to 
the country.  Id. at 2.  Upon re-entry, the respondent failed to present the record of 
his 1924 conviction at the immigration inspector as he had been previously 
instructed to do.  Id.  Later, he was brought before the BIA to face deportation 
proceedings on the basis of his 1924 conviction.  Id. at 1.  The Board noted that if 
the respondent had not left the country, he would not have faced deportation 
proceedings based on the larceny conviction, “first, because the crime was not 
committed within 5 years of the respondent’s entry into the United States, and 
second, because the respondent was not sentenced to imprisonment for a term of 1 
year or more.”  Id. at 2.  His re-entry made him eligible for deportation because 
larceny is a crime that involves moral turpitude.  Id.  For an explanation of what is 
meant by “moral turpitude,” see infra note 76. 
70 Matter of L-----, 1 I. & N. Dec. at 2–3.  The sections of law this case refers 
to were later replaced by INA section 212(c).  See Francis v. INS, 532 F.2d 268, 
270–71 (2d Cir. 1976). 
71 Matter of L -----, 1 I. & N. Dec. at 3.  
72 Id. at 5.  The substance of this part of the Attorney General’s argument was 
as follows: 
 
I cannot conclude that Congress intended the immigration 
laws to operate in so capricious and whimsical a fashion.  
Granted that respondent’s departure in 1939 exposed him on 
return to the peril of a fresh judgment as to whether he should be 
permitted to reside in the United States, such judgment ought not 
to depend upon the technical form of the proceedings.  No policy 
of Congress could possibly be served by such irrational result. 
 
Id. 
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found that the provision could apply to deportation cases and 
instructed future decisions to follow the same line of reasoning.73  
After Matter Of L-----, the BIA’s new policy of applying section 
212(c) to deportation as well as exclusion proceedings was pretty 
well set in stone.74  The BIA applied Matter of L-----‘s reasoning to 
another case called Matter of S-----.75  In that case, the BIA found 
that the respondent’s request for section 212(c) relief from 
deportation should be granted despite the fact that he had been 
inadmissible to the country based upon having committed crimes of 
moral turpitude.76  The BIA reasoned that the INA allowed for relief 
where: (1) the petitioning alien had been lawfully admitted to the 
U.S. as a permanent resident, and (2) had temporarily left the country 
on a voluntary basis rather than as the result of deportation 
proceedings.77  The respondent met these two criteria since he was 
admitted into the country as a permanent resident in 1917 and had 
temporarily left the country of his own volition a number of times.78  
In reaching the determination that the respondent should be granted 
relief, the BIA noted that the respondent had resided in the U.S. for 
                                                          
73 Id. 
74 See Judulang, 132 S. Ct. 476 at 480. 
75 Id.  See also Matter of S-----, 6 I. & N. Dec. 392 (BIA 1954).  In that case, 
the respondent was a national of Spain.  Matter of S-----, 6 I. & N. Dec. at 392.  He 
gained U.S. permanent residency in 1917, after which time he left the United States 
on several occasions.  Id.  He was convicted of petit larceny four times between the 
years 1935 and 1936.  Id.  Apart from this, he was also convicted for “unlawfully 
operating a coin box receptacle” on two occasions in 1933 and 1937, and was 
arrested in 1945 for gambling.  Id. at 393. 
76 Matter of S-----, 6 I. & N. Dec. at 397.  The crime of moral turpitude 
committed here was petit larceny.  See id.  Crimes of moral turpitude are crimes 
“done contrary to justice, honesty, principle, or good morals.”  Michael D. 
Greenberg, Consequences of Criminal Convictions for the Noncitizen, 
IMMIGRATION PRACTICE MANUAL 1901, § 19.4.1 (Massachusetts Continuing Legal 
Educ., Inc., 2012).  It has been defined as “[a]n act of baseness, vileness or 
depravity in the private and social duties which a man owes his fellow man, or to 
society in general, contrary to the accepted and customary rule of right and duty 
between man and man.”  Id. (citing Matter of Franklin, 20 I. & N. Dec. 87, 868 
(BIA 1994)).  This category of crimes is rather broad and complex.  See id.  Crimes 
that have been held to fall within the category include shoplifting, petty theft, and 
aggravated assaults.  Id. 
77 Matter of S-----, 6 I. & N. Dec. at 393. 
78 See id. 
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most of his life and had not committed any more crimes in the years 
following his initial convictions.79  The BIA also seemed to be 
influenced by the fact that the respondent’s employer and neighbors 
thought well of him.80 
In 1976, the Second Circuit decided Francis v. INS, a case that 
quickly revealed a serious problem with the manner in which the BIA 
was deciding deportation cases under section 212(c).81  In Francis, 
the Petitioner appealed the BIA’s decision not to allow him section 
212(c) relief because, although he was lawfully admitted to the 
United States, he had failed to leave the country temporarily since his 
conviction.82  The Second Circuit held that the BIA’s method of 
applying section 212(c) to deportation cases violated the Equal 
Protection Clause because it treated members of the group of 
deported aliens differently: “[d]eportable aliens who had traveled 
abroad and returned could receive Section 212(c) relief, while those 
who had never left could not.”83  The court noted that the Equal 
Protection Clause applies to aliens just as it applies to citizens, even 
where the alien has been placed in deportation proceedings.84  It 
applied a “minimal scrutiny test” to the BIA’s policy under which 
“distinctions between different classes of persons ‘must be 
reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest upon some ground of 
difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the 
legislation, so that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be 
treated alike.’”85  After this case, a deportable alien no longer had to 
leave the country before petitioning for relief under section 212(c).86   
                                                          
79 Id.  
80 Id. at 397. 
81 Judulang v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 476, 480 (citing Francis v. INS, 532 F.2d 268 
(2d Cir. 1976)).  The petitioner in this case had been convicted of a marijuana 
offense.  Francis, 532 F.2d at 269.  The petitioner did not dispute the fact that he 
was deportable, but argued that he should be entitled to relief under 212(c).  Id. at 
270. 
82 See Francis, 532 F.2d at 269. 
83 Judulang, 132 S. Ct. at 480. (citing Francis, 532 F.2d at 273).  
84 Francis, 532 F.2d at 272 (citing Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886); 
Noel v. Chapman, 508 F.2d 1023 (2d Cir. 1975)). 
85  Id. (citing Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7, 14 (1975); Royster Guano Co. v. 
Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920)). 
86 See Judulang, 132 S. Ct. at 480. 
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In the next case in the series, Matter of Silvia, the BIA affirmed 
the principle laid down in Francis, holding that a deportable 
permanent resident could find relief under section 212(c) without 
first leaving the country.87  The BIA acknowledged that some of its 
prior holdings required voluntary departure as a prerequisite for 
obtaining the section 212(c) waiver.88  However, it stated that in light 
of the equal protection arguments made in Francis, it would 
“withdraw” from the “contrary position” it expressed in the past.89  In 
his concurring opinion, Justice Appleman stated that the requirement 
that an alien temporarily leave the country and then return to the U.S. 
in order to be eligible for relief “no longer seem[ed] relevant.”90 
The reach of section 212(c) was altered drastically when AEDPA 
was enacted in 1996.91  Section 401 of AEDPA set up a large 
category of crimes to which the section 212(c) waiver did not apply, 
restricting the number of aliens who could find relief under the 
waiver.92  Shortly after AEDPA was enacted, IIRIRA repealed 
section 212(c) in its entirety.93  Section 212(c) was replaced with a 
new remedy called “cancellation of removal.”94  The government 
                                                          
87 See id.; Matter of Silvia, 16 I. & N. Dec. 26, 31–32 (BIA 1976).  The 
respondent was convicted of possessing marijuana with the intent to distribute.  
Silvia, 16 I. & N. Dec. at 26.  He was sentenced to five years imprisonment, two 
years of special parole, and a $500 fine.  Id.  He had been a lawful permanent 
resident since 1954.  Id. at 27. 
88 See Silvia, 16 I. & N. Dec. at 28–30. 
89 Id. at 29–30.  Interestingly, one might detect a hint of reluctance in the 
court’s concession.  See id.  The court prefaced the concession by stating that it had 
been informed that the Solicitor General would not seek certiorari for the holding 
in Francis.  Id.  One might wonder if the BIA would have continued to apply the 
voluntary departure standard if it had not seemed like it was fighting a losing battle.   
90 Id. at 32–33 (Appleman, Irving A., member, concurring). 
91 See INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 289 (2001). 
92 See id. 
93 See, e.g., Judulang, 132 S. Ct. at 480.  See also St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 289.   
94 Chereck, supra note 28, at 611.  The cancellation of waivers section 
provided that  
 
[a]ny legal, permanent resident alien could apply for cancellation 
of removal if he or she had been a permanent resident for 
minimum of five years, had resided continuously in the United 
States for at least seven years, and had not been convicted of an 
aggravated felony.  To the contrary, the previous relief granted 
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also unified exclusion and deportation actions into a procedure called 
“removal proceeding.”95  Even though the two actions have been 
unified into one proceeding, the statutory bases for the two actions 
remained different.96  There are separate lists of substantive grounds 
for deportation and exclusion proceedings.97   
Public outcry arose concerning the question of whether IIRIRA 
would apply retroactively to permanent residents who had been 
                                                          
under section 212(c) was available even to aggravated felons.  
For non-permanent residents, cancellation of removal required an 
additional three years of physical presence in the United States 
and “a showing that the removal would result in ‘exceptional and 
extremely unusual hardship to the alien’s permanent resident or 
citizen spouse, parent, or child.’”  Furthermore, the petitioner’s 
sentence could not exceed one year.”  
  
Id.  
95 Judulang, 132 S. Ct. at 479. 
96 Id.  
97 Id.  8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) lays out the grounds for excluding an alien from the 
United States.  Id.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(1)–(10) (2006).  Inadmissible aliens 
include those who (1) are excludable on health-related grounds, (2) are excludable 
on criminal related grounds, (3) are excludable on security related grounds, (4) are 
likely to become a public charge, (5) are seeking to enter the U.S. to undertake 
skilled or unskilled labor, (6) are entering illegally and those who have immigration 
violations, (7) are unable to meet the documentation requirements, (8) are not 
eligible to become citizens, (9) have been removed from the United States in the 
past, (10) or are part of a category of miscellaneous individuals including 
polygamists, guardians accompanying helpless aliens, child abductors, those who 
have violated federal, state, or local voting laws, and former U.S. citizens who gave 
up their citizenship to avoid being taxed.  See id. 
8 U.S.C. § 1227(a) lists the classes of deportable aliens.  Judulang, 132 S. Ct. 
at 479.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)–(7) (2006).  Deportable aliens include (1) those 
who are inadmissible at the time they enter the United States or are inadmissible at 
the time their immigration status is adjusted or who violate their immigration 
status; (2) those who commit criminal offenses including those who are convicted 
of crimes of moral turpitude, have more than one criminal convictions, commit 
aggravated felonies, are involved in “high speed flight from an immigration 
checkpoint,” fail to register as sex offenders, those who are convicted of violations 
of laws regulating controlled substances, and those who are convicted of certain 
offenses involving firearms; (3) those who have failed to register or have falsified 
entry documents; (4) those who are engaged in any activity that would threaten the 
security of the United States, (5) those who have become a public charge within 
five years of entry; (6) and those who have violated federal, state, or local voting 
laws.  See id. 
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convicted of crimes before IIRIRA came into force.98  The Federal 
Government’s position on the issue was that the laws did apply 
retroactively, and section 212(c) relief was therefore impossible for 
all cases, including those pending when the legislation came into 
force.99  The government’s opinion on these issues, presented by 
Janet Reno in the Matter of Soriano, “created confusion in the courts 
and resulted in ‘widespread litigation.’”100  Although the opinion 
addressed the possibilities of which dates the legislation would apply 
to, it did not provide any conclusive answers.101  In response to the 
litigation that arose out of the Soriano opinion, the Department of 
Justice (DOJ) came out with a rule that created a uniform method for 
applying AEDPA.102  Under this rule, AEDPA did not apply 
retroactively and aliens who had been placed into deportation 
proceedings before April 24, 1996 could still apply for section 212(c) 
relief.103 
Despite the DOJ’s guidance on the issue, “[t]he issues 
surrounding AEDPA and IIRIRA were not completely settled by the 
Soriano Rule.”104  The circuit courts were split over the question of 
retroactivity.105  This circuit split was not resolved until the Supreme 
                                                          
98 Baldini-Potermin, Lessons From a “Coin Flip”: The U.S. Supreme Court 
and § 212(c) (Again), 89 NO. 6 INTERPRETER RELEASES 293, 294 (2012).  See also 
Chereck, supra note 28, at 611. 
99 See Chereck, supra note 28, at 611.   
100 Id. at 611–12. 
101 See id. at 612.  The issues created by Soriano included: 
 
The possible relevance of various other dates in determining 
whether or not a particular alien was eligible to apply for section 
212(c) relief: the date the alien was placed into proceedings; the 
date the alien applied for section 212(c) relief; the date any 
relevant crimes were committed; and the date any relevant pleas 
or convictions were entered. 
 
Id. at 611–12. 
102 Id.  This is known as the “Soriano Rule.”  Id. 
103 Id. 
104 Id. 
105 See Baldini-Potermin, supra note 98, at 294. 
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Court decided INS v. St. Cyr in 2001.106  In that case, the INS argued 
that the respondent was removable because the new IIRIRA 
legislation affirmed his eligibility for removal.107  Further, the INS 
claimed that the IIRIRA was intended to apply to all removal 
proceedings initiated after its enactment and that the provisions had a 
prospective rather than retrospective effect.108  
In considering whether IIRIRA had retroactively repealed section 
212(c), the Court acknowledged the presumption against retroactive 
legislation.109  It noted that, despite this presumption, Congress has 
the power to give laws retroactive effect as long as its intent do so is 
clear.110  The Court found that there was no clear indication that 
Congress intended to apply IIRIRA’s repeal of section 212(c) 
retroactively, since nothing in IIRIRA’s legislative history even 
mentioned the effect that the legislation would have on “proceedings 
based on pre-IIRIRA convictions that [were] commenced after its 
                                                          
106 See id. (citing INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 316–25 (2001)).  In that case, 
the respondent was a national of Haiti who became a U.S. permanent resident in 
1986.  St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 292.  In 1996, the respondent pleaded guilty to sale of a 
controlled substance, which meant he was subject to deportation.  Id.  In light of the 
recent changes to the law, it was clear that the respondent would have been eligible 
for section 212(c) relief at the time he was convicted, although he was not eligible 
for the waiver by the time removal proceedings began in 1997.  Id. 
107 St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 315. 
108 Id. 
109 Id. at 315–16. 
[This] presumption against retroactive legislation is deeply 
rooted in our jurisprudence and embodies a legal doctrine 
centuries older than our Republic.  Elementary considerations of 
fairness dictate that individuals should have an opportunity to 
know what the law is and to conform their conduct accordingly; 
settled expectations should not be lightly disrupted.  For that 
reason, the “principle that the legal effect of conduct should 
ordinarily be assessed under the law that existed when the 
conduct took place has timeless and universal human appeal.”   
 
Id. at 316 (quoting Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp v. Bonjorno, 494 U.S. 827, 
855 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring)). 
110 Id. (“Requiring clear intent assures that Congress itself has affirmatively 
considered the potential unfairness of retroactive application and determined that it 
is an acceptable price to pay for the countervailing benefits.”) (quoting Landgraf v. 
USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244, 268 (1994)). 
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effective date.”111  Further, the effective date of IIRIRA itself could 
not be considered evidence that Congress intended to create a 
retroactive effect.112  The Court coupled the presumption against 
retroactivity of an ambiguous statute with “the longstanding principle 
of construing any lingering ambiguities in deportation statutes in 
favor of the alien,” to come to the conclusion that Congress did not in 
fact determine that IIRIRA would apply retroactively.113 
The next step in the Court’s inquiry was determining whether 
refusing to allow section 212(c) relief to removable aliens would 
produce an “impermissible retroactive effect” for aliens who had 
entered guilty pleas before section 212(c) was repealed.114  The Court 
reasoned that to determine whether a statute has retroactive effect, it 
must be decided whether the statute “attaches new legal 
consequences to events completed before its enactment.”115  It is 
important to determine whether retroactive application allows for fair 
notice and reasonable reliance.116  
The Court found that, in the case at hand, the application of 
IIRIRA clearly attached new legal consequences to the state of affairs 
                                                          
111 Id. at 318.  The Court also pointed out that Congress had made an effort to 
specify sections of IIRIRA that did have retroactive effect.  Id. at 318–19.  The fact 
that it did this for certain provisions but not for the provisions that replaced section 
212(c) showed that it did not intend to decide how IIRIRA would apply to 
convictions that were entered before IIRIRA was enacted.  Id. at 319-20. 
112 St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 317.  The Court noted that,  
 
[t]he mere promulgation of an effective date for a statute does not 
provide sufficient assurance that Congress specifically 
considered the potential unfairness that retroactive application 
would produce.  For that reason, a “statement that a statute will 
become effective on a certain date does not even arguably 
suggest that it has any application to conduct that occurred at an 
earlier date.” 
 
Id. (citing Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 257). 
113 Id. at 320 (citing INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 449 (1987)). 
114 Id.  
115 Id. at 321 (citing Martin v. Hadix, 527 U.S. 343, 357–58 (1999) (“A statute 
has retroactive effect when it ‘takes away or impairs vested rights acquired under 
existing laws, or creates a new obligation, imposes a new duty, or attaches a new 
disability in respect to transactions or considerations already past.”)). 
116 Id. (citing Martin, 527 U.S. at 358). 
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that existed before the statute was enacted.117  The aliens who entered 
guilty pleas before IIRIRA was enacted did so believing that entering 
such pleas would allow them to qualify for section 212(c) relief.118  It 
did not matter that section 212(c)’s relief was discretionary, and 
therefore not guaranteed.119  It was sufficient that aliens in a situation 
similar to the respondent were highly likely to have received relief 
under the statute and were likely to have relied upon such relief.120  
Having drawn these conclusions, inter alia, the Court held that 
despite section 212(c)’s repeal, the waiver would still apply to 
removable aliens who had entered guilty pleas before section 
212(c)’s repeal and would have been eligible for section 212(c) relief 
at the time the plea was entered.121   
The Court’s decision in INS v. St. Cyr fueled a series of legal 
reactions from the various agencies and courts wielding jurisdiction 
over the applicable issues.122  For example, the DOJ issued a 
regulation requiring deportation charges to correspond to a ground 
for excluding an alien for admission into the country.123  Further, the 
BIA decided in a series of cases that deportable aliens convicted of 
aggravated felonies could not invoke relief under section 212(c).124  
The circuits split once again, this time concerning the issue of what 
approach to use to determine whether an alien qualified for the 
section 212(c) waiver.125  
                                                          
117 St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 321. 
118 Id. at 322–23.  “Given the frequency with which § 212(c) relief was granted 
in the years leading up to AEDPA and IIRIRA, preserving the possibility of such 
relief would have been one of the principal benefits sought by defendants deciding 
whether to accept a plea offer or instead to proceed to trial.”  Id. at 323. 
119 Id. at 325. 
120 Id.  
121 Id. at 326. 
122 See Baldini-Potermin, supra note 98, at 294.   
123 See id. 
124 Id.  These cases were In re of Blake, 23 I. & N. Dec. 722 (B.I.A. 2005) and 
In re Brieva-Perez, 23 I. & N. Dec. 766 (B.I.A. 2005).  Id.  However, the BIA used 
these cases to emphasize that section 212(c) did not apply to aggravated felons.  Id.  
Exceptions to that rule were allowed for “drug possession and drug-trafficking 
convictions and where a lawful permanent resident was eligible to apply for 
adjustment of status in conjunction with a § 212(c) waiver.”  Id. 
125 Judulang v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 476, 483 (2011); Baldini-Potermin, supra 
note 98, at 294. 
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The Second Circuit applied an offense-based statutory 
approach.126  This approach evaluated the “underlying offense of a[] 
[permanent resident]’s deportation charge” to determine whether the 
permanent resident displayed the same characteristics as someone 
who could be excluded from the United States.127  Based on the 
court’s approach in Francis,128 this approach has been criticized by at 
least one scholar, who argued that it “impermissibly expanded the 
reach of Francis, creating the unnecessary step of evaluating a 
petitioner’s underlying offense.”129 
The First, Third, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Tenth, and 
Eleventh Circuit Courts of Appeal favored the “comparable grounds 
approach.”130  The comparable grounds approach relies on 
determining whether the statutory ground for deportation charged has 
an equivalent in the statutory grounds for exclusion.131  If the ground 
for deportation is “substantially equivalent” to one of the grounds for 
exclusion, the alien being considered for removal may seek relief 
under section 212(c).132  If the ground for deportation does not 
correspond with one of the grounds for exclusion, the alien may not 
seek relief under section 212(c).133  Although the Ninth Circuit 
                                                          
126 Discretionary Waiver of Deportation in Absence of Voluntary Departure, 
U.S. SUP. CT. ACTIONS 1 (2011). 
127 Sara Fawk, Immigration Law—Eligibility for Section 212(c) Relief from 
Deportation: Is it the Ground or the Offense, the Dancer or the Dance?, 32 W. 
NEW ENG. L. REV. 417, 421 (2010). 
128 Francis v. INS, 532 F.2d 268 (2d Cir. 1976). 
129 Fawk, supra note 127, at 421. 
130 Id. at 441. 
131 Judulang v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 476, 481–82 (2011). 
132 Id. 
133 Id. at 482.  This approach is possible because as stated previously, the 
statutory grounds for deportation and exclusion are different.  The following 
examples provided by the Court in Judulang v. Holder may help to illustrate how 
this comparison works: 
 
Take first an alien convicted of conspiring to distribute 
cocaine, whom DHS seeks to deport on the ground that he has 
committed an “aggravated felony” involving “illicit trafficking in 
a controlled substance.” 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(43)(B), 
1227(a)(2)(A)(iii).  Under the comparable-grounds rule, the 
immigration judge would look to see if that deportation ground 
covers substantially the same offenses as an exclusion ground.  
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initially also followed the comparable grounds approach, it 
eventually became wary of the comparable grounds approach and 
rejected it in its decision in Abebe v. Mukasey.134  It opted instead for 
a rationality-based test and presented a legitimate government 
interest argument for treating aliens who leave the country 
voluntarily differently from those who do not when determining 
which aliens are eligible for section 212(c) relief.135 
 
III. FACTS 
Joel Judulang’s story begins much like that of the countless other 
immigrants whose cases come before an immigration judge or other 
court of review.  Judulang immigrated to the United States from the 
Philippines in 1974 when he was eight years old.136  Various 
members of Judulang’s family became U.S. citizens, including his 
                                                          
And according to the BIA in Matter of Meza, 20 I. & N. Dec. 257 
(1991), the judge would find an adequate match––the exclusion 
ground applicable to aliens who have committed offenses 
“relating to a controlled substance,” 8 U.S.C. §§ 
1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(II) and (a)(2)(C). 
Now consider an alien convicted of first-degree sexual 
abuse of a child, whom DHS wishes to deport on the ground that 
he has committed an “aggravated felony” involving “sexual 
abuse of a minor.” §§ 1101(a)(43)(A), 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii).  May 
this alien seek § 212(c) relief?  According to the BIA, he may not 
do so—not because his crime is too serious (that is irrelevant to 
the analysis), but instead because no statutory ground of 
exclusion covers substantially the same offenses.  To be sure, the 
alien’s own offense is a “crime involving moral turpitude,” 8 
U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I), and so fits within an exclusion 
ground . . . . But on the BIA’s view, the “moral turpitude” 
exclusion ground “addresses a distinctly different and much 
broader category of offenses than the aggravated felony sexual 
abuse of a minor charge . . . .”  And the much greater sweep of 
the exclusion ground prevents the alien from seeking 
discretionary relief from deportation. 
 
Id. 
134 Fawk, supra note 127, at 445–46; see also Abebe v. Mukasey (Abebe II), 
554 F.3d 1203 (9th Cir. 2009).   
135 See Fawk, supra note 127, at 446–47. 
136 Brief for Petitioner at 24, Judulang v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 476 (2011) (No. 
10-694), 2011 WL 2678268, at *24.   
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parents and two sisters.137  Judulang’s daughter was also a U.S. 
citizen by birth.138  However, Judulang never naturalized.139  His 
parents stated that they did not put Judulang through the 
naturalization process because they “d[id] not know the intricacies of 
immigration law.”140  Judulang lived continuously in the U.S. as a 
lawful permanent resident for thirty-six years.141   
Despite the fact that Judulang was raised in the United States, his 
status as a permanent resident did not shield him from facing removal 
from the U.S.142  On the contrary, two separate criminal convictions 
placed Judulang on the path to deportation.143  In 1988, Judulang pled 
guilty to voluntary manslaughter after taking part in a fight in which 
someone was killed.144  Because Judulang was not the killer, he was 
charged as an accessory and was sentenced to six years in prison for 
this crime.145  He served less than two years of the sentence before 
being released on probation.146  In 2005, Judulang pled guilty to a 
crime involving theft.147  DHS began deportation proceedings based 
                                                          
137 Id.  It is also notable that Judulang’s grandfather became a U.S. citizen by 
virtue of serving in the U.S. military in the Philippines.  Id. 
138 Id. 
139 Id.  
140 Brief for Petitioner, supra note 136, at 24–25. 
141 Judulang v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 476, 482 (2011); Brief for Petitioner, supra 
note 136, at 24.  This case’s procedural record reveals some confusion regarding 
Judulang’s immigration status.  See Judulang v. Gonzales, 249 F. App’x 499 (9th 
Cir. 2007).  In the earlier proceedings, the Ninth Circuit rejected Judulang’s claim 
to derivative citizenship based on his parents’ citizenship status.  Id. at 501.  
Although Judulang argued that both of his parents had been naturalized in the 
United States, the court could not find conclusive evidence that both of Judulang’s 
parents naturalized before he turned eighteen.  Id. at 501–02.  Accordingly, the 
court held that Judulang failed to meet the burden required to overcome the 
rebuttable presumption of alienage created by his birth in the Philippines.  See id. at 
501. 
142 See infra notes 143–48 and accompanying text. 
143 See infra notes 144–47 and accompanying text. 
144 Judulang v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 476, 482–83 (2011). 
145 Brief for Petitioner, supra note 136, at 25. 
146 Id. 
147 Judulang, 132 S. Ct. at 483.   
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on the charge of “aggravated felony” involving a “crime of 
violence,” based on the manslaughter conviction from 1988.148   
The immigration judge presiding over the case found that 
Judulang would have been eligible for section 212(c) if not for the 
six-year sentence he was given for the crime, which disqualified 
him.149  The BIA “affirmed on different grounds,” holding that 
Judulang could not apply for relief under section 212(c) because the 
“crime of violence” ground for deportation had no equivalent in the 
statutory scheme for exclusion.150  The Ninth Circuit denied 
                                                          
148 Id.  
149  Brief for Petitioner, supra note 136, at 25. 
150 See id.; Judulang, 132 S. Ct. at 483.  The BIA’s holding was based on the 
holding in the case Brieva-Perez v. Gonzales, 23 I. & N. Dec. 766 (2005).  Brief for 
Petitioner, supra note 136, at 25.  In Brieva-Perez, the respondent was a native of 
Columbia who came to the U.S. as an LPR in 1980.  Brieva-Perez, 23 I. & N. Dec. 
at 767.  He pled guilty to “unauthorized use of a motor vehicle,” in 1993.  Id.  After 
respondent was convicted, the INS placed him in removal proceedings based on the 
charge of “aggravated felony ‘crime of violence.’”  Id.  An immigration judge 
found that the INS properly categorized the respondent’s offense and also held that 
the respondent was not eligible for relief under section 212(c) since the offense did 
not match a comparable exclusionary ground.  See id.  On appeal, the BIA was 
asked to decide whether the respondent’s crime had properly been categorized.  See 
id.  The BIA held that unauthorized use of a motor vehicle was properly 
categorized as a crime of violence because “[a]n unauthorized driver is likely to use 
physical force to gain access to a vehicle and to drive it.”  Brieva-Perez, 23 I. & N. 
Dec. at 770.  Because this correct classification meant that the respondent qualified 
as “an alien convicted of an aggravated felony,” he was declared to be removable.  
Id.  Further, the BIA found that the immigration judge correctly denied the 
respondent’s eligibility for a 212(c) waiver because the respondent’s crime did not 
match closely enough with any of the statutory grounds for exclusion.  Id. at 772–
73.  The BIA reasoned that, 
 
although there need not be perfect symmetry in order to find that 
a ground of removal has a statutory counterpart in section 212(a), 
there must be a closer match than that exhibited by the incidental 
overlap between 101(a)(43)(F) (crime of violence) and section 
212(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) (crime involving moral turpitude).  The 
distinctly different terminology used to describe the two 
categories of offenses and the significant variance in the types of 
offenses covered by these two provisions lead us to conclude that 
they are not “statutory counterparts” for purposes of section 
212(c) eligibility. 
 
Id. at 773. 
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Judulang’s petition for review, opting to rely on circuit precedent 
affirming the comparable grounds approach.151  The Supreme Court 
granted certiorari.152 
Judulang’s main arguments upon receiving certiorari were 
threefold.153  First, he argued that the BIA’s decisions in the cases 
Matter of Blake154 and Brieva-Perez v. Gonzales155 changed the 
BIA’s previous policy of granting section 212(c) waivers in 
deportation cases, resulting in an impermissible retroactive effect.156  
Second, he argued that the BIA’s new policy of determining section 
212(c) relief eligibility was arbitrary and capricious because it 
depended on “semantic differences in the exclusion and deportation 
provisions” and depended on the “irrelevant and fortuitous factor[]” 
of a permanent resident’s travel history.157  Third, Judulang argued 
that the BIA’s approach violated equal protection since there was “no 
rational basis for distinguishing between [permanent residents] who 
traveled abroad and returned before being placed in deportation 
proceedings and those who did not.”158 
 
 
                                                          
151 Judulang v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 476, 483 (2011).  
152 Id. 
153  Brief for Petitioner, supra note 136, at 26–28. 
154 In re Blake, 23 I. & N. Dec. 722 (B.I.A. 2005). 
155 Brieva-Perez v. Gonzales, 23 I. & N. Dec. 766 (B.I.A. 2005). 
156 Brief for Petitioner, supra note 136, at 26–27.  In his brief, Judulang took 
issue with the Ninth Circuit’s position on the waiver, stating that the 
 
suggestion that Section 212(c) does not apply in deportation 
proceedings at all is contrary to years of congressionally 
approved agency practice. Congress has consistently 
acknowledged that Section 212(c) provides relief from 
deportation as well as exclusion, and even the government has 
not contended otherwise.  Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit’s 
approach offers no basis for affirming the judgment below. 
 
Id.  
157 Id. at 27. 
158 Id. at 27–28. 
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IV. ANALYSIS OF OPINION 
The question presented to the Court was “whether the BIA’s 
policy for applying § 212(c) in deportation cases is ‘arbitrary [or] 
capricious’ under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. 
§ 706(2)(A).”159  From the outset, Justice Kagan160 stressed that the 
law governing this case is very straightforward.161  An administrative 
agency must give a reasonable explanation for the policy it sets.162  
This is a firm standard, although it is not a difficult one to meet.163  
When examining a policy to see if it is arbitrary and capricious, the 
Court exercises a narrow scope of review, giving deference to the 
agency’s judgment in implementing the policy.164  The Court looks to 
see “whether the decision was based on a consideration of the 
relevant factors and whether there has been a clear error of 
judgment.”165 
Justice Kagan began her opinion presenting a brief outline of the 
history of section 212(c), focusing on the differences between the 
                                                          
159 Judulang v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 476, 483 (2011). 
160 Justice Kagan wrote on behalf of a unanimous court.  See id.  Justice Kagan 
is the newest justice sitting on the Supreme Court, and previously served as the 
U.S. solicitor general.  Paul Wickham Schmidt, Answering Questions About the 
Supreme Court’s Judulang Decision, 59 FED. LAW. 18 (2012). 
161 Judulang, 132 S. Ct. at 479. 
162 Id. 
163 Id. 
164 Id. at 483. 
165 Id. at 484 (quoting Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of U.S., Inc. v. State Farm 
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983)).  In Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of U.S., 
Inc., the Court laid out the following criteria for determining whether an agency 
policy is arbitrary and capricious: 
 
 Normally, an agency rule would be arbitrary and capricious if the 
agency has relied on factors which Congress has not intended it 
to consider, entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the 
problem, offered an explanation for its decision that runs counter 
to the evidence before the agency, or is so implausible that it 
could not be ascribed to a difference in view or the product of 
agency expertise. 
 
Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of U.S., Inc., 463 U.S. at 43. 
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justifications used for exclusion and deportation proceedings.166  She 
explained how two separate lists––one identifying the crimes that 
make an alien excludable and the other identifying the crimes that 
make an alien deportable––overlap and diverge in various ways.167  
She also noted how, historically, section 212(c) relief only applied to 
excludable aliens.168  Justice Kagan highlighted the difficulties that 
started to arise when the BIA began to apply section 212(c) to 
deportation proceedings, and the conflicting results that came out of 
the BIA’s decision in the case Matter of L----- that discretionary 
relief would only be granted to deportable aliens that left and 
reentered the country.169  
Justice Kagan then briefly discussed the Second Circuit’s holding 
in Francis that allowing discretionary relief only to aliens who first 
left the country violated the Equal Protection Clause.170  She noted 
how this decision encouraged the BIA to forego the use of an alien’s 
travel history in determining section 212(c) eligibility.171  Justice 
Kagan then discussed section 212(c)’s repeal and explained her own 
Court’s holding in its decision in INS v. St. Cyr that the waiver 
should still be available to those aliens who entered guilty pleas 
before the waiver was repealed.172  She emphasized that in coming to 
this decision, the Court was concerned with how it could best 
preserve “familiar considerations of fair notice, reasonable reliance, 
and settled expectations.”173 
After concluding this historical review, Justice Kagan proceeded 
to lay out the specifics of the process the BIA utilizes to apply the 
section 212(c) waiver to current cases.174  She noted that applying the 
waiver to exclusion cases is straightforward because all the BIA has 
to do is check the statutory ground upon which DHS bases the 
                                                          
166 Judulang, 132 S. Ct. at 483. 
167 Id. at 479. 
168 Id. at 479–80. 
169 Id. at 480.  For a discussion of the facts and holding of Matter of L-----, see 
supra notes 69–73 and accompanying text. 
170 Judulang, 132 S. Ct. at 480.  For a discussion of the facts and holding of 
Francis v. INS, see supra notes 81–86 and accompanying text. 
171 Judulang, 132 S. Ct. at 480. 
172 Id. at 480–81. 
173 Id. at 481 (citing INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 323 (2001). 
174 Id. at 481–82. 
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exclusion decision.175  As long as the statutory ground is not one of 
the two grounds that make an alien ineligible for the waiver, the alien 
will be considered for relief.176  If the alien is eligible, the BIA 
simply decides whether to grant relief by focusing on a variety of 
factors including how long the alien has lived in the U.S., the alien’s 
family background, and the seriousness of the crime committed.177 
Justice Kagan noted that despite the straightforward nature of the 
exclusion analysis, there is a noticeable difference in the level of 
difficulty when ascertaining waiver eligibility if the alien in question 
has been slated for deportation.178  To illustrate how complex the 
process for determining eligibility for the waiver is in a deportation 
case, Justice Kagan described the two approaches the BIA has 
employed over time to accomplish the task.179  She noted that the 
first approach, which the BIA used in the past, is much like the 
method it utilizes for exclusion cases.180  The BIA first looked to see 
whether the crime for which the alien was being deported fell within 
one of the statutory exclusion grounds.181  If it did, the BIA applied 
the same kind of factors-based test used in exclusion cases.182 
Justice Kagan then moved on to the second approach that the BIA 
had been using to determine waiver eligibility in deportation cases 
since 2005—the comparable grounds approach.183  She likened the 
comparable grounds approach to a Venn diagram: “Within one circle 
are all the criminal offenses composing the particular ground of 
deportation charged.  Within other circles are the offenses composing 
the various exclusion grounds.  When, but only when, the 
                                                          
175 Id.  
176 Judulang, 132 S. Ct. at 481–82. 
177 Id.  The specific list of factors that Justice Kagan includes are, “the 
seriousness of the offense, evidence of either rehabilitation or recidivism, the 
duration of the alien’s residence, the impact of deportation on the family, the 
number of citizens in the family, and the character of any service in the Armed 
Forces.’” (citing INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 296 (2001)). 
178 Id. at 481. 
179 Id. at 481–82. 
180 Id. at 481. 
181 Id. 
182 Judulang, 132 S. Ct. at 481. 
183 Id.  
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‘deportation circle’ sufficiently corresponds to one of the ‘exclusion 
circles’ may an alien apply for [section] 212(c) relief.”184 
Although Justice Kagan recognized the authority that federal 
agencies have over their statutes, she emphasized that the Court 
cannot turn a blind eye to suspect policies.185  Courts are responsible 
for making sure that agencies make policies that are reasonable.186  
Courts must look to see whether an agency’s decision “was based on 
a consideration of the relevant factors and whether there has been a 
clear error of judgment.”187  Justice Kagan then stated that the BIA 
had failed the test of reasonableness by deciding whether an alien 
qualified for section 212(c) relief by relying on a “chance 
correspondence” between the various deportation and exclusion 
categories.188  Such an inquiry could not determine whether an alien 
should be allowed to remain in the United States.189 
Justice Kagan took note of the parties’ disagreement over 
whether the waiver should be applied equally in both exclusion and 
deportation cases.190  While Judulang argued that it should, the 
Government argued that immigration law has always treated 
exclusion and deportation cases differently and that the Government 
has valid reasons for doing so because applying section 212(c) 
uniformly to both types of cases might cause aliens to effectively use 
that type of discretionary relief as a crutch.191  Justice Kagan declined 
to reach these arguments, stating that the dispute between the two 
                                                          
184 Id. at 482. 
185 See id. at 483–84. 
186 See id. 
187 Judulang, 132 S. Ct. at 484 (citing Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of U.S., Inc. 
v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983)). 
188 Id. 
189 Id.  In fact, the only reason why Judulang was refused section 212(c) relief 
by the BIA was that the deportable crime of violence he had been charged with did 
not have a corresponding exclusionary basis.  Id.  Judulang’s argument was that if 
he would have qualified for relief in an exclusion case (which he would have based 
on his previous crime of voluntary manslaughter, a crime of moral turpitude 
covered by an exclusion ground), then he should also be able to seek section 212(c) 
in the instant deportation case.  See id. (citing Brief for Petitioner, supra note 136, 
at 47–51).   
190 Id. 
191 Id. at 484–85. 
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parties was irrelevant.192  She made it clear that the Court did not 
question the BIA’s policy preferences for limiting the extent of 
section 212(c) relief, noting that it may have legitimate reasons for 
doing so.193  The Court’s only concern was whether the BIA was 
applying its chosen policy reasonably.194 
Justice Kagan then went on to explain why the use of the 
comparable grounds rule does not meet the reasonability 
requirement, likening the usefulness of the inquiries it measures to 
that of flipping a coin.195  The approach does not consider the actual 
merits of the case.196  It fails to examine the factors that might be 
important to establishing whether or not an alien should be eligible 
for section 212(c) relief.197  Instead, it bases the entire decision of 
eligibility “on an irrelevant comparison between statutory 
provisions.”198  Justice Kagan argued that although the Court would 
not decide whether Judulang should be entitled to relief, the fact that 
his case failed under the comparable grounds approach did not make 
him less deserving of the relief.199  Justice Kagan also expressed the 
Court’s concern that the outcome of the comparable grounds 
approach may depend on how a particular immigration official 
decided to charge the alien in question.200  Depending on how the 
                                                          
192 Judulang, 132 S. Ct. at 485. 
193 Id. 
194 See id. 
195 Id. at 485–86. 
196 See id. at 486. 
197 Judulang, 132 S. Ct. at 487. 
198 Id. at 485. 
199 See id. at 485–86. 
200 Judulang, 132 S. Ct. at 486.  Justice Kagan noted that,  
 
the Government has provided no reason to think that immigration 
officials must adhere to any set scheme in deciding what charges 
to bring, or that those officials are exercising their charging 
discretion with § 212(c) in mind . . . . So at base everything hangs 
on the fortuity of an individual official’s decision.  An alien 
appearing before one official may suffer deportation; an 
identically situated alien appearing before another may gain the 
right to stay in this country. 
 
Id. (citation omitted). 
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alien is charged, his or her conviction may fall in various deportation 
grounds that may or may not correspond to specific exclusion 
grounds.201 
Next, Justice Kagan identified and rejected the government’s 
three arguments defending the comparable grounds approach.202  The 
government’s first argument was that the comparable grounds rule is 
in keeping with section 212(c)’s language.203  Justice Kagan’s 
response to this argument was that the government’s description of 
the statute was incorrect; it only directs the Attorney General to 
“admit any excludable alien, except if the alien is charged with two 
specified grounds.”204  Furthermore, the statute is not aimed at 
deportation cases in the first place, so it is inapplicable anyway; it 
only instructs how to deal with exclusion cases.205  The government’s 
second argument was that the comparable grounds rule is valid 
because it has been utilized over the years.206  The Court’s response 
was that the BIA’s approach was not in fact consistent, but varied 
throughout the years.207  This variance is evidenced by the BIA’s 
approaches in Matter of T-----,208 Matter of Granados,209 and Matter 
of Hernandez-Casillas.210  Lastly, the government argued that the 
                                                          
201 See id. 
202 Id. at 487–90. 
203 Id. at 487. 
204 Id.  
205 Judulang, 132 S. Ct. at 488. 
206 See id. 
207 Id. 
208 Matter of T-----, 5 I. & N. Dec. 389, 390 (BIA 1953).  In this case, the BIA 
denied section 212(c) relief to an alien who had entered the U.S. without inspection 
and by making false representations.  Id. at 389–90.  The BIA emphasized that 
section 212(c) discretion is limited to the deportation grounds fond in the INA.  Id. 
at 389.  
209 Matter of Granados, 16 I. & N. Dec. 726, 728 (BIA 1979).  In this case, the 
BIA found that section 212(c) relief could not waive deportability based on a 
“conviction of possession of an unregistered sawed-off shotgun.”  Id. at 726.  
Because possession of such a shotgun was not a ground of excludability, it was not 
covered by section 212(c).  Id. at 728.  The BIA emphasized that although its 
decision in Francis extended the reach of section 212(c)’s applicability, it “did not 
increase the statutory grounds to which section 212(c) relief may be applied.”  Id. 
210 Judulang, 132 S. Ct. at 488–89.  See Matter of Hernandez-Casillas, 20 I. & 
N. Dec. 262, 266 (BIA 1990).  The case involved a Mexican citizen who was 
charged with entering the U.S. without inspection.  Id. at 263.  In discussing the 
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comparable grounds rule “saves time and money.”211  The Court 
responded to this argument by stating that although cost is an 
important consideration, low cost is not a means for overcoming an 
arbitrary and capricious policy.212  The Court also noted that the 
                                                          
respondent’s eligibility for a section 212(c) waiver, the BIA cited Matter of 
Granados, 16 I. & N. Dec. 726, inter alia, for the proposition that the waiver was 
only available to aliens whose deportation ground corresponded with a 
“comparable ground of exclusion.”  Id. at 264–65.  The BIA found that requiring 
corresponding deportation and exclusion grounds presented an “anomalous 
situation,” and stated that it would change its approach to extend section 212(c) to 
all deportability grounds except a few specific grounds related to “subversives and 
war criminals.”  Id. at 265.  It reasoned as follows: 
 
It is . . . evident that section 212(c) has . . . been expanded to 
encompass many aliens not originally contemplated by the 
statute.  We have concluded that the same fundamental 
fairness/equal protection arguments made in Francis v. INS . . . 
can and should be invoked to make section 212(c) relief available 
to aliens deportable under any ground of deportability except 
those where there is a comparable ground of exclusion which has 
been specifically excepted from section 212(c). . . . Having made 
the section 212(c) waiver, a form of relief ostensibly available 
only in exclusion proceedings, available in deportation 
proceedings, we find no reason not to make it applicable to all 
grounds of deportability with the exception of those comparable 
to the exclusion grounds expressly excluded by section 212(c), 
rather than limiting it, as now, to grounds of deportability having 
equivalent exclusion provisions. 
 
Id. at 266.  The BIA conceded that this new expansion conflicted with its prior 
holdings in cases like Granados.  Id.  It chose to turn from Granados and similar 
decisions that “limited the availability of section 212(c).”  Id. at 267.  In keeping 
with its new approach, the BIA remanded the respondent’s case to allow the 
respondent an opportunity to apply for the section 212(c) waiver.  Id. at 269.  
211 Judulang, 132 S. Ct. at 489.  The Government’s exact argument was that 
the current approach of comparing deportation grounds to exclusion grounds was 
more simple than the approach Judulang was advocating since it could “be 
accomplished in just a few ‘precedential decisions’” which could be applied to 
multiple cases.  Id.  Judulang’s approach would be more cumbersome because it 
would inherently require the Government to look at each conviction and decide 
whether it fell within one of the grounds for exclusion.  Id.  In other words, the 
Government’s argument was essentially that the current approach allowed the 
Government to do less work and also lowered the number of aliens who qualified 
for relief.  See id. 
212 Id. at 490.   
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comparable grounds rule probably didn’t save as much money as the 
government argued it did.213  In reality, Judulang’s approach would 
be very similar to what has been done in the past, which would allow 
for use of existing precedent.214 
In conclusion, the Court stated that it must reverse a policy when 
it cannot find a reason for the policy.215  Justice Kagan emphasized 
that in this case, the BIA’s comparable grounds rule was not 
reasonably connected to “the purposes and concerns of the 
immigration laws.”216  She also emphasized that deportation 
decisions cannot be left to chance.217  Since the government could not 
successfully argue that the comparable grounds rule should be 
applied, it could not “pass muster under ordinary principles of 
administrative law.”218  For these reasons, the Ninth Circuit’s 
                                                          
213 Id. 
214 Id.  The Court also noted that if the Government’s interest was cost and 
time effectiveness, it could come up with an alternative policy that would be 
economically efficient as long as the policy complied with the instant decision and 
the Court’s decision in St. Cyr.  Id. 
215 Id. 
216 Judulang, 132 S. Ct. at 490.  Specifically, the comparable grounds rule 
“allows an irrelevant comparison between statutory provisions to govern a matter 
of the utmost importance–whether lawful resident aliens with longstanding ties to 
this country may stay here.”  Id.  In a passionate critique of the methodology 
behind the rule, Justice Kagan wrote, 
 
recall that the BIA asks whether the set of offenses in a particular 
deportation ground lines up with the set in an exclusion ground.  
But so what if it does?  Does an alien  charged with a particular 
deportation ground become more worthy of relief because that 
ground happens to match up with another?  Or less worthy of 
relief because the ground does not?  The comparison in no way 
changes the alien’s prior offense or his other attributes and 
circumstances.  So it is difficult to see why that comparison 
should matter.  Each of these statutory grounds contains a slew of 
offenses.  Whether each contains the same slew has nothing to do 
with whether a deportable alien whose prior conviction falls 
within both grounds merits the ability to seek a waiver. 
 
Id. at 485. 
217 Id. at 487. 
218 Id. at 490. 
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decision was reversed and the case was remanded.219 
 
V. IMPACT 
A. Judulang’s Impact on Administrative Law 
 
The arbitrary and capricious standard promotes method and order 
in immigration decisions.  Immigration is a complex area and, in 
light of the current buzz surrounding this legal topic, it is important 
for courts deciding immigration cases to have a sound basis of law to 
work from instead of utilizing an ad hoc approach that has no basis in 
precedent.  The demands of the arbitrary and capricious standard 
encourage adopting solid methodology.  Although in Judulang the 
Court did not definitively state which method should be applied to 
deportation cases,220 it did make it clear that methods such as the 
comparable grounds rule, which have no basis in reason, cannot be 
utilized to remove aliens from the country.221 
In her opinion, Justice Kagan made the point that the arbitrary 
and capricious standard is designed to prevent decisions from being 
made based on chance.222  As was evidenced through this note’s 
discussion on the impact of the Francis holding, rules that are 
arbitrary can have consequences as severe as violations of 
constitutional equal protection rights.223  When deportation cases are 
not decided upon chance, immigrants have greater access to due 
process and are able to avoid some of the severe consequences that 
come from being separated from their families and lives in the United 
States. 
The arbitrary and capricious standard also promotes discipline in 
agencies that are required to make discretionary decisions while 
giving the agencies great deference in decision-making.  In Judulang, 
the Court made it clear that the BIA can make its own decisions 
concerning the standards it uses to determine which aliens qualify for 
the section 212(c) waiver.224  The Court was simply saying that the 
                                                          
219 Id. 
220 See Baldini-Potermin, supra note 98, at 294. 
221 See supra Part IV. 
222 Judulang, 132 S. Ct. at 487. 
223 See supra notes 81–86 and accompanying text. 
224 Judulang, 132 S. Ct. at 483, 485, 490. 
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BIA cannot establish whether or not aliens in Judulang’s situation 
should be eligible for section 212(c) relief through the comparable 
grounds method, because there is no reason behind it.225  Because the 
Court takes a narrow approach to adjudicating the soundness of 
agency policies under the Administrative Procedure Act, agencies 
can be assured of maintaining autonomy.226  The Court only holds 
agencies accountable for being reasonable when making policy 
decisions.227 
 
B. Judulang’s Impact on Immigration Law 
 
Judulang was arguably highly anticipated by the immigration law 
community.228  It was expected that the case would answer important 
questions about whether section 212(c) relief would be available after 
the passage of IIRIRA and AEDPA.229  Despite the fact that the case 
did not address every conceivable issue concerning deportation cases, 
Judulang represents a step in the right direction.  In this case, we see 
the Court encouraging clarity in defining standards for deportation 
cases, where such standards have been missing in the past.  Although 
on a smaller scale this case seems only to affect deportation cases, 
the Court’s demand that the BIA meet a higher standard in decision-
making in this one area may well affect other important immigration 
questions. 
Perhaps most importantly, the Court in Judulang followed its INS 
v. St. Cyr ruling, affirming that section 212(c) relief does apply to 
those permanent residents who were convicted of crimes before 
AEDPA and IIRIRA came into effect.230  Affirmation of what is 
arguably a generous extension of amnesty for aliens (dare say, even 
criminal aliens) may come as a shock to those who cast a wary eye 
on immigrants in general.231  Although it would be incorrect to 
                                                          
225 See id. at 490. 
226 Id. at 483 (stating that, “a court is not to substitute its judgment for that of 
the agency.”) (quoting Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. 
Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983)). 
227 Id. at 484–85. 
228 See, e.g. ALEINIKOFF ET AL., supra note 55, at 754.   
229 See id. 
230 See Baldini-Potermin, supra note 98, at 294. 
231 See supra notes 7–9 and accompanying text. 
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assume that the Judulang Court was making a political statement 
about how aliens should be treated, the Court’s decision might at 
least signify that removal of criminal aliens is not simply a race 
against the clock; but, rather, has powerful and important legal 
implications which require any methods employed to be utilized 
carefully rather than haphazardly. 
Notably, the court also overruled the BIA’s decisions in the cases 
Matter of Blake and Matter of Brieva-Perez, where the BIA found 
that aliens deportable on the basis of having committed aggravated 
felonies were barred from obtaining relief under section 212(c).232  
The Court found that the standards used to evaluate these cases were 
arbitrary and capricious.233  Blake’s precedent was actually what the 
BIA had used to come to the conclusion that Judulang was not 
entitled to section 212(c) relief at the administrative level.234  Blake 
embodied the comparable grounds rule, requiring that an alien’s 
ground of deportability have a comparable ground of exclusion 
before allowing the alien relief under section 212(c).235 
There is evidence that the Judulang holding has attracted 
attention in the legal field.236  After the Court’s decision was 
                                                          
232 See Baldini-Potermin, supra note 98, at 294–95. 
233 Id. at 295.  See also supra note 124 and accompanying text.  For a detailed 
discussion of the facts and holding in Brieva-Perez, see supra note 150. 
234 See Schmidt, supra note 160, at 18–19. 
235 See id. at 18. 
236 See Baldini-Potermin, supra note 98, at 296.  After the case was decided, 
one immigration blog utilized the implications of its holding as a warning to 
resident aliens.  See Judulang v. Holder: Resident Aliens Beware!, 
findanimmigrationattorney.com (Jan. 16, 2012 10:43 AM), 
http://www.findanimmigrationattorney.com/Featured-News/2012/Judalang-v-
Holder-Resident-Aliens-Beware-.aspx.  
 
What began as a typical immigration/deportation issue has 
now become a nationally recognized deficit in government policy 
and procedure.  If we cannot rely on the governing boards of our 
nation to practice sound, reasonable, and fair decision making 
processes, then just who or what can we trust?  
. . . .  
Too often, it would seem that the Board of Immigration 
Appeals’ has ruled for deportation, or denial to appeal to the 
Attorney General for relief, when it has no  rationale for doing so.  
The case of Judalang [sic] v. Holder may be one of hot contest  at 
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released, a group of legally affiliated associations came out with a 
practice advisory that applied the Judulang holding to various aspects 
of immigration law.237  The advisory also discussed motions to 
reopen the cases of permanent residents that were removed from the 
United States and provided sample motions that can be utilized by 
practitioners.238  Although this might be considered a small 
development in the law, its implications may actually prove quite 
enormous for an area of the law where motions to reopen have 
virtually been unheard of in the past.239 
Cases like Judulang may very well signify that important changes 
are coming to immigration law.240  Adriane Meneses has noted that, 
“[r]ecent Supreme Court holdings seem to be calling for 
Congressional re-consideration of immigration laws, especially in 
areas in which criminal law intersects with immigration 
regulation.”241  In particular, Meneses writes that holdings such as 
Judulang “appear to be significant signs of a move away from 
unfettered expansion of excludability and deportability as well as on-
going restriction or elimination of review and relief.”242   
                                                          
the moment, but it certainly begs questions such as, “How many 
like it came before; how many like it are still to come?”  
 
Id. 
237 Baldini-Potermin, supra note 98, at 296.  See also IMPLICATIONS OF 
JUDULANG V. HOLDER FOR LPRS SEEKING § 212(C) RELIEF AND FOR OTHER 
INDIVIDUALS CHALLENGING ARBITRARY AGENCY POLICIES, AMERICAN 
IMMIGRATION COUNCIL, NATIONAL IMMIGRATION PROJECT OF THE NATIONAL 
LAWYERS GUILD & IMMIGRANT DEFENSE PROJECT (2012) [hereinafter 
IMPLICATIONS], available at 
http://www.nationalimmigrationproject.org/legalresources/practice_advisories/pa_I
mplications_%20of_Judalang_v_Holder.pdf.  
238 Baldini-Potermin, supra note 98, at 296.  See also IMPLICATIONS, supra 
note 237.  The Honorable Paul Wickham Schmidt has also suggested that 
immigration courts and the BIA may see motions to reopen the cases of aliens 
whose cases were decided under the BIA’s decision in decision.  See Schmidt, 
supra note 160, at 19.  For more on Blake, see supra notes 124, 230–33 and 
accompanying text. 
239 See supra notes 35–39 and accompanying text. 
240  Meneses, supra note 5, at 785. 
241 Id. 
242 Id.  
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Whatever impact Judulang may have, it is important to note that 
any effects may not extend far into the future.243  This is because “the 
number of deportable respondents who pleaded [sic] guilty before 
April 24, 1996—and thus could benefit from the Court’s ruling in 
Judulang—is probably dwindling.”244  Once that generation of 
respondents fades out, the Judulang decision may no longer carry so 
much weight, since it will essentially be a moot point.245 
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
There has been much debate surrounding the deportation of 
criminal aliens.  The 1996 immigration reforms embodied by 
AEDPA and IIRIRA have had a significant impact on the availability 
of certain forms of relief for permanent residents convicted of crimes 
that made them deportable.  One of the most important impacts the 
legislation had was the removal of the section 212(c) waiver.  Before 
AEDPA and IIRIRA were adopted in 1996, section 212(c) of the 
INA allowed permanent residents who pled guilty to certain crimes to 
file a petition with the Attorney General, who would then decide 
whether to allow the permanent resident relief from deportation. 
After AEDPA and IIRIRA came into force, the section 212(c) 
waiver became a thing of the past.  However, both administrative 
courts and the circuit courts struggled with questions of retroactivity 
and adopted varying approaches to how to deal with cases in which 
permanent residents who would have been eligible for the section 
212(c) waiver before the legislation was enacted still sought some 
kind of relief from deportation.  The confusion led to a series of 
appeals alleging flawed judicial reasoning in making determinations 
as to which aliens would be allowed to utilize the waiver even after 
its repeal. 
This note focused on the Supreme Court’s recent decision in 
Judulang v. Holder, the result of years of confusion concerning what 
standard the BIA should apply to cases where section 212(c) relief is 
still at issue.  In this case, the Court found that the BIA’s method of 
comparing the grounds established for an alien’s deportation to the 
                                                          
243 See Schmidt, supra note 160, at 19. 
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245 See id. 
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statutory grounds for excluding an alien from the U.S. (the 
“comparable grounds” approach) was arbitrary and capricious, as it 
was not rooted in any reasonable theory. 
Judulang has impacted both immigration law and administrative 
law by reinforcing the notion that standards for the review of 
immigration cases must be grounded in sound reasoning and cannot 
be invented on a whim.  Although the case does not address every 
issue related to immigration law, it does take a step forward by 
resolving at least one issue in the area of the deportation of criminal 
aliens.  As the number of deported aliens remains steady and, 
perhaps, increases, this decision promises to remain of particular 
importance for some time.  If nothing else, it ensures that a portion of 
the population that is often viewed as “the worst of the worst” still 
has access to fairly adjudicated proceedings, a principle which is at 
the core of a properly functioning judicial system. 
